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The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of the current composition of 
Ukrainian energy systems, analyze its dependence on Russian energy sources, explore 
alternatives to diversify the supply of fuel resources (oil, gas, nuclear fuel), and offer 
insights on the best future possible solution for Ukraine. Currently, a substantial part of 
energy in Ukraine is produced with gas and oil supplied from Russia. Oil and gas 
strategic reserves are not enough to withstand possible long-term fluctuations in supply. 
So, fluctuations either in volume or price of supplied gas and oil can influence economic 
conditions. A monopoly supplier might cause significant dependence of the domestic 
economy upon a foreign country. This might give the supplier country an opportunity to 
control and dictate.  
The Russian President and much of the political leadership did not support the 
most recent political developments in Ukraine (e.g., Presidential elections, “Orange 
Revolution. Ukraine’s political goals include development of closer cooperation with the 
EU, U.S. and NATO. This would not match Russian foreign policy interests toward 
former Soviet Republics. Economic influence by Russia could be used to influence 
Ukrainian foreign policy.  
The goals of this thesis are to show that the search for alternative sources of 
energy for Ukraine is a very important aspect for economic and political independence, 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the modern world, the significance of energy sources to vital human functions 
grows constantly. The development of energy industries is not only part of economic 
development - it becomes its integral condition. Economic development and energy 
resources are interrelated in the same way as demand and proposition is in a market 
economy. Economic development determines energy demand, and availability of energy 
quantity (and quality) determines the rate of economic growth. The significance of 
energy for economic development can be presented by the fact that industrialized 
countries, with about one quarter of the world's population, account for some three- 
quarters of the global energy consumption today.1 Therefore, the availability of energy 
resources for one particular country can significantly influence its economical 
development; it causes dependence on energy resources for the country’s economy. 
Countries with natural energy reserves are in an advantageous position compared to 
countries without such resources. Interrelations among them might place less secured 
countries into economic dependence on energy resources of more advanced countries. 
This thesis will analyze the situation when one particular country – Ukraine - depends on 
foreign energy sources. Moreover, primary energy sources, such as oil, natural gas and 
nuclear fuel, are mostly supplied by a single country–(i.e., Russia), which makes it a 
monopoly supplier.  
The hypothesis of this thesis is that Ukraine depends on Russian energy resources, 
and that this dependence is used by Russia as an economic leverage in bilateral relations. 
Ukrainian oil and gas reserves are not enough to withstand possible long-term 
fluctuations in supply. So, fluctuations either in volume or price of supplied gas and oil 
can affect economic conditions in general. Also, changes in nuclear fuel supply can cause 
a collapse of uninterrupted processes on nuclear power plants, which would bring large 
material losses. Using such dependence, a monopoly energy supplier is able to influence 
the economy of a dependent country. The economic advantage makes it capable to dictate 
terms of economic interrelations.  
                                                 





However, economic dictatorship and control can be used not only in economic 
cooperation, but also for achieving political goals. Thus, this thesis presents the historical 
examples of Russia-Ukraine relations when economic leverages were used for political 
pressure in order to bring Ukraine to the terms of Russian policy.  
The Russian President and much of the political leadership did not support the 
results of the most recent political developments in Ukraine (e.g., the Presidential 
elections and the “Orange Revolution”). The new Ukrainian government is politically 
independent and eager to provide new state domestic and foreign policies directed to the 
development of a free market economy and cooperation with the Western countries, EU, 
and NATO. Those newest political goals would not match the interests of Russian foreign 
policy towards former Soviet Republics. Although Russia does not have political 
instruments for influencing Ukrainian domestic and foreign policies, it is capable of 
strong economic interference in the Ukrainian energy market. If Ukraine desires to be 
fully independent in its political self-determination, it should find a way to eliminate or 
decrease Russian economic influence. In this perspective, the search for alternative 
sources of energy might be very important for Ukraine’s economic and political 
independence.  
The objective of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of the current composition of 
Ukrainian energy systems, identify dependence on Russia by energy sources and its 
influence on political self-determination, explore the available alternatives for the 
Ukrainian energy market development, and offer insights on the best possible solution for 
Ukraine.  
Analysis of the given problem will be conducted with the help of presented data 
and by deductive reasoning. None of the expected conclusions and propositions should be 





II. GENERAL STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF ENERGY 
SYSTEMS OF UKRAINE 
Ukraine is an important segment of the world’s energy market. It is a critical 
transit center for energy resources between Europe, Russia, and Asia. Ukraine is also one 
of the largest countries in Europe, and a significant energy producer and consumer in the 
regional economy. 
The Ukraine’s energy systems can be generally divided onto four parts: oil 
production, consumption, and oil transit; natural gas production, consumption, and gas 
transit; coal mining industry; and electricity production and consumption. The Ministry 
of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine exercises the overall control in all areas of the energy 
industry. 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF OIL PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND 
OIL TRANSIT 
1. Oil Production and Consumption2 
The Ukraine has 395 million barrels of proven oil reserves. Most reserves are 
spread through central and eastern regions with the majority located in the Eastern 
Dnieper-Donetsk basin. Although Ukraine has made efforts at oil exploration, 
particularly in its sector of the Azov Sea, oil production has remained relatively constant 
since Ukraine obtained its independence in 1992. However, consumption has fallen 
dramatically, from 813,000 barrels per day in 1992 to around 415,000 barrels per day in 
2004. Despite consumption declines, the Ukraine is still highly dependent on imported 
oil. For example, in 2003, net crude oil imports totaled roughly 350,000 barrels per day, 
representing about 80% of consumption. There are two main oil suppliers – Russia and 
Kazakhstan. Most of the oil comes from Russia – about 96 percent of all imported oil, 
and lesser amounts from Kazakhstan – about 4 percent. 
Ukraine has six crude oil refineries with the joint capacity of about 1 million 
barrels per day. This capacity could cover domestic demand for oil products three times 
over. However, refineries do not work in full capacity.  During the 1990s they did not 
                                                 
2 Numeric data presented in this section derived from the official website of Ukrainian State Company 





receive enough crude oil to satisfy even Ukraine’s domestic petroleum product demand. 
This situation became better in the last few years, when Ukraine started to offer oil 
exporters in Russia and Kazakhstan limited ownership in Ukrainian refineries. Recent 
success in the process of privatization of its refineries gave Ukraine the opportunity to 
increase oil supply to meet domestic demand and bring in the capital for investing in 
renovations. 
2. Oil Traffic and Oil Transit3 
The unique geographic location of Ukraine makes it an ideal corridor for oil 
transit from Russia and the Caspian Sea region countries to the European market. There 
are more than 2,800 miles of oil pipe lines in Ukraine, combined in three major pipelines 
nets: “Prydniprovsky oil-trunk pipe-lines”, “Oil-trunk pipe-line “Druzhba”, and oil pipe-
line “Odessa-Brody.” All the pipeline nets are controlled by the company “Ukrtansnafta”, 
which belongs entirely to the state. The main tasks of “Ukrtransnafta” are to deliver crude 
oil to Ukraine’s oil refineries and to transit crude oil from Russia and Kazakhstan to 
European and global markets.  
As oil transit from the Caspian Sea region towards Europe is expected to increase 
over the next several years, Ukraine hopes to become the transit center for this oil stream. 
For that purpose, the pipeline “Odessa-Brody” and Black Sea marine terminal 
“Pivdenniy” were completed in 2001, which connected the Black Sea port Odessa with 
the city of Brody. “Odessa-Brody” was initially designed to load Caspian oil from 
terminal “Pivdenniy” and then carry it through the Ukrainian system to Europe. Expected 
capacity of this complex is about 300,000 barrels per day. However, “Odessa-Brody” has 
been inactive for approximately three years because Ukraine was unable to secure oil 
supplies from Caspian Sea area suppliers. Russian companies exploited this situation and 
proposed to use the pipeline in the reverse direction - to transport oil from Russia 
southwards to tankers in the Black Sea and then to world markets. Since January 2003, 
Russian oil companies have used part of the “Odessa-Brody” pipeline for these purposes 
- called “reverse”.  
                                                 






During 2003-2004, the Ukrainian government has pledged several times that the 
“Odessa-Brody” pipeline would be used only for its original purpose, but was 
nevertheless still using it for “reverse” transit. This became an issue between countries of 
the European Union, Ukraine, and Russia.  
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION, 
CONSUMPTION, AND GAS TRANSIT 
1. Natural Gas Production and Consumption4 
Ukraine has 39.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves and six gas-refining 
plants. Average annual production from reserves is about 0.69 trillion cubic feet. At the 
same time, average annual consumption of natural gas is around 3 trillion cubic feet, 
which places Ukraine in the sixth position in the world. Therefore, roughly 2.3 trillion 
cubic feet of gas Ukraine needs to be purchased from foreign suppliers. There are two 
countries that supply gas for Ukraine: Russia and Turkmenistan. Initially, Russia was the 
major contributor to the gas market of Ukraine, supplying gas partly as a payment for gas 
transit through Ukraine to Europe and partly as a sale under annual contracts. For the last 
several years, Turkmenistan has become the larger source of gas imports on the basis of 
long-terms agreements. Currently, Ukraine buys 40 percent of internally consumed gas 
from this country, and the present agreement on supply is effective through the period of 
2002 through 2006. Additionally, the governments of both countries have announced an 
initiative to make the next period much longer - 2007through 2032.  
2. Natural Gas Transit to Europe5 
Ukraine plays an important role as a major transit country for European and world 
natural gas markets. Through its territory flows about 75 percent of Russian gas exported 
to European and other countries. One-third of the amount of European gas consumption 
transits through Ukraine’s territory. The combined length of Ukrainian gas pipelines is 
about 23.2 thousand miles. 
The current technical condition of the Ukrainian gas pipeline network is 
becoming a growing concern to Russian gas producers, Ukrainian gas transporters, and 
                                                 
4Numeric data presented in this section derived from the official website of the Ukrainian State 
Company “Gas Ukrayny”. 
5 Numeric data presented in this section derived from the official website of the Ministry of fuel and 





European gas consumers. Some of the pipes will be worn out in the near future. There are 
pipes that have been working 20-30 years without major repair due to lack of available 
funds. Also, full capacity utilization is a problem. System capacity allows transporting 
20-25 percent more than it does in fact. In order to upgrade and manage the pipeline 
network more completely, the heads of three states – Ukraine, Russia, and Germany – 
agreed in June 2002 to establish the Consortium for the Management and Development 
of the Gas Transport Network. Next year, a new company will created by agreement 
between Naftohas Ukrainy and Gazprom (e.g., Russian state-owned oil and gas 
company), with each holding a 50 percent stake. German’s Ruhrgas has been invited to 
participate as a consulting partner. Representatives from other countries of Europe and 
the Caspian Sea basin have voiced interest in the consortium: Gaz de France, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. 
In March 2004, parties of the consortium announced their decision to construct a new gas 
pipeline connecting the eastern Ukrainian city of Uzgorod with the city of Novopolsk on 
the Ukrainian-Slovakian border. The expected capacity of the new segment is 1 trillion 
cubic feet per year, which will increase the Russian gas flow to Europe by 25 percent. 
Construction plans give it two years to complete the project. It is interesting that the 
Ukraine guaranteed a zero tax on gas flow through its territory until the investors, 
Russian Gazprom and Naftohas Ukrainy, recover their investments.  
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY6 
Ukraine has 37.6 billion short tons in proven reserves. Production and 
consumption of coal in Ukraine has been relatively constant for the last 8 years. Despite 
having sizeable coal resources, Ukraine, unfortunately, cannot satisfy domestic demand 
for coal. Average production constitutes little more than 80 million short tons of hard and 
brown coal. At the same time, consumption exceeds production by about 7 million tons 
yearly, which makes Ukraine a net importer.  
Most of Ukraine’s coal reserves are located in the eastern parts of the country - in 
the Donetsk and Donbass regions. Until recently, the coal mining industry was 
completely state-owned and had been managed by the vertical structure of numerous state 
                                                 






organizations under the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. Ineffective management caused a 
number of problems: hazardous working conditions, low productivity and inefficiency, as 
well as labor strikes. Since 1991, the industry has suffered 700 underground fires and 
accidents, with 3,500 people dead. 
The government of Ukraine realizes that restructuring of the coal mining industry 
has become a task of first priority. For a long period of time, government heavily 
subsidized the coal industry, and about half of all mines operated at a loss. In 2002, the 
Ministry of Fuel and Energy announced the intentions to privatize part of the mines, 
especially the most inefficient. However, privatization is proceeding slowly due to 
unattractive conditions of the coalmines for sale. Foreign investors have also supported 
restructuring of the industry. For period of seven years, beginning in 1997, the World 
Bank has provided over $300 million in aid. A considerable part of money was spent to 
close unprofitable mines. At the same time, the government of Ukraine is not enthusiastic 
about the associated job losses, especially in the regions with few other job opportunities.  
D. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION IN UKRAINE7  
Ukraine’s installed electricity capacity is 54 gigawatts, twelfth largest in the 
world. Since obtaining independence in 1991, production and consumption of electricity 
generally decreased. However, since 2000, it has increased consistently. Currently, this is 
the only energy industry where Ukraine is the net exporter. Existing capacity allows 
Ukraine to generate electricity more than twice its needs. However, the distribution 
system is in poor condition and needs upgrade and improved maintenance, as a 
significant amount of generated power is wasted during its transfer.  
Ukrainian electricity is produced by three types of power plants: thermal plants 
using fuel (oil, gas, and coal), nuclear plants, and hydroelectric stations. Nuclear plants 
produce nearly 50 percent of generation, while thermal and hydroelectric plants produce 
40 and 10 percent, respectively.  
Ukraine currently has four operating nuclear power plants with combined capacity 
of 12.8 gigawatts, equivalent to about 24 percent of total capacity. All nuclear fuel is 
                                                 






supplied by Russia. Nuclear wastes are also processed in Russia. After the operational 
problem at the notorious Chernobyl power plant, the government resumed construction of 
two new reactors at the Khmelnitsky and Rivne power plants. Those projects were begun 
during the Soviet era and then suspended due to lack of financial resources. The intention 
to renew construction has been criticized because of existing sufficient electricity 
capacity and the high price of the project. However, a decision has been made in favor of 
resuming the construction.  
The government tightly controls the electricity market. Since 1997, there has been 
a central market for wholesale electricity. Power producers sell the energy to the common 
market operated by “Energorynok” (a division of state enterprise “Ukrenergo”), and 27 
regional distribution companies resell to the end users. In 2003, plans to privatize 27 
regional electricity distribution companies were announced, in order to bring the 
efficiency of distribution to a desirable level. Currently, six are fully privatized. 
There are several problems that retard the development of the electrical power 
market in Ukraine. Apart from huge transmission losses, there are some worries about the 
privatization process. The government has been reluctant to give more than a minority 
share in the privatized companies, which has slowed down the process. Also, there were 
worries that the state budget will not receive enough compensation because of unfair and 
sometimes corrupt sales.  
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RUSSIAN PORTION IN IMPORTED ENERGY  
As can be seen, every division of Ukraine’s energy systems uses imports in 
varying degrees. The coal mining industry has good potential relative to internal demand, 
but currently 10 percent of the coal consumed is imported. Natural gas consumption is 25 
percent internally produced and 75 imported. The oil production and refinery industry is 
the most dependable on imported sources, as 80 percent of oil consumed is foreign 
supplied. All of the fuel for nuclear power plants is also imported. In this section this 





As a former part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was supplied with oil and gas in 
significant proportions by a centralized supply system. If the data presented in Table 1 is 
compared, it can be seen that Ukrainian domestic oil production has been constantly 
decreasing, starting from 1985. Oil consumption, however, was increasing until 1991. 
After that point, where Ukraine became dependent, consumption has decreased. 
Table 1.   Oil production and consumption in Ukraine8  
Similar dynamics is seen in the gas industry. The data in Table 2 presents 




1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Gas production 
(billion cubic meters) 
 
47,2 46,8 44,2 38,0 36,5 32,9 24,4 22,2 20,1 18,0 18,2 
Gas consumption 
(billion cubic meters) 
 
88,0 91,7 94,4 103,5 111,8 115,2 117,1 93,5 89,3 86,7 80,5 
Table 2.   Natural gas production and consumption in Ukraine9  
Again, after 1991, when Ukraine obtained independence, gas consumption was 
decreasing constantly. Before that, though, it was increasing despite declining levels of 
production. This shows us that Ukraine was dependent on external energy sources during 
the time of the Soviet Union. As Russia was the largest gas and oil producer in the Union, 
it is appropriate to surmise that the majority of energy supplied to Ukraine came from 
Russia.  
If the structure of imports of oil, coal, nuclear fuel, and even natural gas to 
Ukraine today is analyzed, one can see how significant Russia’s supply to the Ukraine’s 
                                                 
8 Perevezenzev, Naftochimichna I gazova promyslovist of Ukraine. Donetsk, 1998, DIOKON 
9 Perevezenzev, Naftochimichna I gazova promyslovist of Ukraine. Donetsk, 1998, DIOKON 
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energy is. All of imported coal comes from Russia, which is 10 percent of national coal 
consumption. About 96 percent of imported oil is supplied from Russia, which is about 
77 percent of oil consumption. The Ukraine's nuclear sector is 100 percent supplied with 
Russian fuel rods for its nuclear power plants. Also, Russia does all of the reprocessing of 
Ukrainian nuclear waste.  
There is a very interesting situation with natural gas supply to Ukraine. The 
largest current supplier of gas to the Ukraine is Turkmenistan, the second largest natural 
gas producer in the former Soviet Union after Russia. By 2007, Turkmenistan’s annual 
exports are expected to reach 3,530 billion cubic feet.10 About 40 percent of the gas 
consumed in the Ukraine comes from Turkmenistan. Russia still supplies a significant 
portion of gas to Ukraine’s economy, about 35 percent; but this comes as a payment for 
gas transit to Europe through Ukrainian territory. At first glance, the possibility that 
Russia would be able to influence the Ukrainian gas market is not so obvious, because 
Russia is supposedly committed to supplying gas to the Ukraine, and Turkmenistan 
seems to be the larger player in this situation. However, Turkmenistan and Russia are 
closely interdependent in this matter. Although Turkmenistan has huge natural gas 
reserves with relatively lower cost of extraction, it does not play a leading role in setting 
regional gas price. Russia has a significant role in gas redistribution in the region and, so, 
has some control of gas pricing. Although Russia itself buys natural gas from 
Turkmenistan, it uses that gas mostly for redistribution among former Soviet Republics 
through its own pipeline systems. Turkmenistan is heavily dependent on Russia because 
it does not have its own gas transportation infrastructure.  
There is also Uzbekistan, who sells gas at even cheaper prices than Turkmenistan. 
Russia also buys gas from Uzbekistan. Having control over redistribution of gas in the 
region, Russia can manipulate price formation in order to influence gas markets. For 
example, in December 2004, Turkmenistan raised the gas prices for Russia and the 
Ukraine, blaming increased production costs and higher costs of gas extraction 
equipment. After both countries ignored this announcement, Turkmenistan turned off 
supplies to them on December 31, 2004. Ukraine did not have much choice but to agree 
                                                 





to the higher price. Russia, in its turn, refused to buy Turkmenistan gas, thus reducing the 
Turkmen gas exports by 247 billion cubic feet for 2005.11 Russia could meet its gas 
needs on its own. Moreover, there were some political rumors that Russia provoked 
Turkmenistan to raise prices in order to “punish” the Ukraine for the “Orange 
Revolution” that took place one month before.  
The meaning of that “punishment” was that Russia could influence the Ukraine 
without any direct confrontations, and react to Ukrainian political developments. Of 
course, this was not an official position of Ukrainian authorities. Moreover, it is mostly 
erroneous, because Turkmenistan would never do such a thing, even under Russian 
political pressure, as it would not be in the interest of Turkmenistan. However, this idea 
shows us how Russia might influence the natural gas market in this region.  
Also, Russia has a plan to construct a new pipeline for gas transportation to the 
European community trough the Baltic Sea, which would avoid the territories of transit 
countries. If this plan is realized, then the Ukraine will lose its transit country privileges 
for Russian gas, and probably be compelled to buy gas for cash. Having such a huge 
advantage from possession of energy sources and influence on energy price formation, as 
well as supplying the greatest part of energy resources for the Ukraine’s economy, Russia 
can possibly exercise significant control of deliveries of coal, natural gas, nuclear rods, 
and oil to Ukraine.  
On several occasions, Russia has tried to demonstrate this capability in the gas 
and petroleum industries. One such example took place in 1993, when Russia was still 
the Ukraine’s largest gas supplier. One week prior to the Crimea summit between 
Presidents El’tsin and Kravchuk, the Russian state gas company, Gazprom, reduced gas 
supply to Ukraine by 25 percent. The official reason was the Ukrainian debt for gas. 
During summit talks, Ukrainian delegation was warned of the possibility of Russia 
stopping its gas supply completely in the event of disagreement with Russian summit 
proposals. In 1995, Russia pressed the Ukraine to join a custom union with Russia, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Russia imposed unrealistically high prices on gas and oil and 
threatened the Ukraine with supply cutoffs until it joined the union.  
                                                 





The most obvious case is the oil industry. Having complete domination of 
Ukrainian petroleum imports, Russia can substantially influence the Ukrainian oil 
industry through changes in crude oil supplies. Thus, during the first two months of 2000, 
Russia drastically reduced oil supplies to Ukraine. This oil blockade was officially 
justified by Ukraine’s large debts, and to protest the unregulated, illegal cutting of 
Russia’s gas pipeline through the Ukraine. At the time, oil supplies were about 70 percent 
below its previous level. The result was a significant reduction in electricity production. 
Regions scheduled electricity cutoffs for several hours a day over 3 months. The 






III. WHY MIGHT RUSSIA USE ITS ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES 
TO INFLUENCE UKRAINIAN ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS? 
In the previous chapter it has been demonstrated that there is a theoretical 
possibility of Russia’s influence on Ukrainian economic development and even political 
self-determination through its monopolized supply of energy to the Ukraine. However, 
such a possibility might not mean that it would necessarily be exercised. What then might 
be the motivations for Russia to be interested in asserting influence over Ukraine? In this 
chapter three major areas in which Russia would be interested in to exploit its advantage 
will be presented: increasing influence and economic power in the region, enhancement 
of the Russian geopolitical situation and frontiers by increased control over front line 
states, and reducing U.S. and NATO influence in the region and the preventing of NATO 
enlargement. 
A. INCREASING RUSSIA’S POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND ECONOMIC 
POWER IN THE REGION 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia announced itself as the 
successor of the collapsed state. Immediately after that, Russia started to assert its 
absolute leadership, consolidating all former Soviet Republics under its patronage. The 
creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States was initially an attempt to reunite 
states on the basis of sovereign equality. Though, it would now be the equal alliance 
between countries that are so unequal in terms of economic development and political 
interests. In fact, this organization was an attempt to revive the Soviet system, when all 
members were equal with a “more equal” Russia. There are many examples of Russia’s 
leading and dictating policy toward CIS members: multiple interventions in internal 
political processes, such as support of preferred candidates during Presidential elections, 
and using economic leverage in relationships with CIS members, such as with Ukraine 
and Moldova. The next step in consolidation of states, on the basis of equality in 
economic interaction, is the creation of a Common Economic Space. This economic 
union was not a result of a direct dictate by Russia, but it was the result of its strong 
policy for associating former Soviet Republics back into a Russian community. The 





eliminating some tariffs and customs regulations, as well as canceling export limitations 
between members. In this case, Russia’s interest is not in directly dictating economic 
rules and directions (which is not possible), but close consolidation of CIS countries in 
order to limit economic interaction with countries of the European Union or the Middle 
East. However, political developments of the last two years show that perhaps Russia is 
no longer unconditionally the political leader. Revolutionary events in Georgia, Ukraine, 
and Kyrgyzstan did not match the plans and interests of Russia. 
Moreover, at the beginning of year 2005, Ukraine stated that the CIS had 
completed its mission and was no longer essential. Then, during the First Integration 
Forum of the Common Economic Space, the Ukraine announced its possible withdrawal. 
"Unfortunately, the CIS has proved ineffective. And all heads of state recognized that 
during the latest informal summit," said Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Borys Tarasyuk, 
during the May 11th press conference in Kyiv.12 This can be interpreted as a sign of the 
redistribution of political and economic power in the region. It would then be illogical to 
assume Russia would voluntarily give up leadership in this region. Quite the contrary, a 
logical continuation would be use of all economical and political means to maintain such 
a position.  
What means are available? The members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States have become more and more politically independent. New generations of political 
leadership and developing political consciousness among people has changed the 
situation drastically. It is no longer possible to talk only about the political influence of 
Russia. Basically, it would be right to say that Russia is not now capable of full political 
control over the CIS. However, it is still capable of enormous economic influence, and 
this is really effective leverage to maintain a leading position.  
This analysis leads to a simple conclusion: Ukraine’s economic dependence on 
Russia’s energy recourses might be used to achieve Russian interests of maintaining and 
increasing economic and political power in the region. 
 
 
                                                 





B. ENHANCEMENT OF RUSSIA’S GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION AND 
FRONTIERS BY INCREASED CONTROL OVER FRONT LINE STATES 
The intention to maintain and increase Russian political influence and economic 
power in the region is in pursuit of another goal – the enhancement of the country’s 
borders. The former Soviet Union military doctrine implied the necessity of a large buffer 
zone between itself and the western world. At the time, this role was played by the so-
called Countries of the Socialist Camp. It is obvious that Russia, as the successor of the 
Soviet Union, would adopt such a doctrine and try to build a buffer zone between itself 
and Europe and the Middle East. Russia is surrounded and separated from Western and 
Middle East countries by the former Soviet Republics. Those countries are now viewed 
by Russia as a new buffer zone, so critical for its national security. Loss of influence over 
this zone would mean decreased national security. If not controlled, countries of the CIS 
might turn to the West and develop relationships with traditional rivals of Russia – 
developed European countries and NATO members. If, for example, Ukraine joins the 
European Union, Russia will become the immediate neighbor of its opponent. 
Although Russia looks at the countries of CIS as Russia’s near abroad or some 
kind of buffer zone, the Ukraine does not share this point of view and acts as a sovereign 
state. Thus, there is a loss of political control by Russia over the Ukraine. As was 
discussed earlier, there are no really effective political leverages against Ukraine, but 
there are still sizable economic means that Russia can use in advancing its interests in its 
relationship with the Ukraine. 
C. REDUCING U.S. AND NATO INFLUENCE IN THE REGION AND 
PREVENTING THE NATO ENLARGEMENT 
Although the Cold War and inimical relationships between Russia and 
U.S./NATO are no longer present, modern Russia and U.S./NATO are still political 
rivals. Increased economic and political influence by the U.S. and NATO over the world 
inevitably decreases Russia’s power further. It is therefore in Russia’s interest to prevent 
US/NATO expansion of influence to the former Soviet Union. Russia, however, cannot 
do much to stop the U.S. or NATO from achieving their objectives. Politically and 
militarily, US/NATO and Russia are not enemies, and they even have mutual 
understandings for the global anti-terrorist war. So there is no way for Russia to blame 





cannot prevent the increasing influence of U.S./NATO on countries near Russia, if it 
were wanted. At the same time, Russia understands that NATO will never accept new 
members who are in close relationships with Russia, as this would give Russia the ability 
to influence internal NATO political processes. Also, a country that is in alliance with 
Russia or is dependent on Russia will never become a full ally with the U.S. for the same 
reasons, and Russia is most likely right in those estimations. Therefore, to keep the 
bordering countries, including Ukraine, in close relationships and, even better, in political 
or economic dependence, is a good way to prevent them from joining NATO or having 
close relations with the U.S. Russia has successfully used this tactic for the last decade. 
The most expressive example of this tactic in relations with Ukraine is joint use of the 





IV. WHY RUSSIA HAS NOT EXERCISED ITS HUGE 
POTENTIAL INFLUENCE YET 
One might question the significance and capabilities of Russia’s role in the 
economic development of Ukraine. The question might be: “Why does Russia have such 
a huge potential for influence, but has yet to exercise it? Or, if Russia did try, why was 
their success limited?” In this chapter it will be shown why Russia, having potential to 
establish some control over the Ukraine, did not realize it in such an extensive degree as 
it could have. This author’s opinion is that Russia’s attitude toward Ukraine (post 1991) 
and relations with them can be divided into two phases. The first period of 3 to 4 years is 
characterized by a lack of Russian policy. During this period, Russia simply did not 
realize the necessity of exercising influence over the Ukraine. The second phase started 
after about four years of independence, and continued to the present. It is Russia’s 
attempt to make up for lost time. This phase consists of Russia’s trials and errors in 
establishing influence over the Ukraine. However, Russia was not able to restore its 
weakened political power, and, more crucial, Russia could not effectively use its 
economic potential to restore its political influence. To do that, Russia would have to 
exercise all its economic strengths directly and forcefully. In turn, this would mean a 
break in political relations between two countries and possibly a political confrontation. 
Evidence of Russia’s failure in the area of political and economic influence on 
Ukraine would be the defeat of Russia’s policy in the Presidential elections and the 
“Orange Revolution” in December 2004. Those developments showed there were 
significant shortcomings in Russia’s strategy toward the Ukraine. Although Russian 
authorities, at high levels, have always pronounced their concern about the Russia-
Ukraine relationship, Russia has not been able to formulate a consistent strategy. This 
lack of convergence between theory and practice is probably the most paradoxical aspect 
of the history of Ukraine-Russia relations after independence. 
For both historical and cultural reasons, the Russian people did not take Ukrainian 
independence very seriously. Initially, nobody in Russia was really thinking about the 





Ukraine was treated as part of some state formation with Russia at the center. The 
creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States has only strengthened this opinion. 
The government of Russia has also failed to act accordingly. Since Ukraine 
obtained independence, there has been no articulated political strategy towards Ukraine 
as an independent state. Policy makers did not internalize the independence of the 
Ukraine. It was even less accepted than the independence of other former Soviet 
Republics. Even when the term “independence” was used, it had been accompanied by a 
relatively strong conviction that this was all temporary. Mistakenly, there simply was 
perceived no need to develop policy towards the Ukraine. According to Russian weekly 
correspondent S.Tikhii, Ukraine was estimated as a “young sister” who “might return 
back at any moment.”13 Even in 1994, 43 percent of respondents in Russia’s cross-
country poll about Ukraine’s independence did not regard Ukraine as a sovereign 
country!14 Evidence about Russia’s “special treatment” to Ukraine would include the 
systematic and open involvement of Russian politicians in the Ukraine’s internal politics. 
For example, during the Presidential campaign in 1994, Russian President B. Yeltsin 
spoke on public television, supporting acting President Kuchma’s election for the next 
term. There have been several allegations made by the opposition that President Kuchma 
enjoyed financial support by Russia. Russia, of course, pursued its own interests in 
keeping Kuchma’s cabinet in office. Personal relations between Kuchma and Yeltsin 
guaranteed Ukraine’s cooperation, and Kuchma’s opponents were more antagonistic to 
Russia. 
On the other hand, it might be that providing any policy towards an independent 
Ukraine could accentuate its actual independence more than Russia wanted. Even much 
later, in February 2000, a poll of the Russian political and economic elite showed that 31 
percent of the respondents did not recognize Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group, and 
instead considered them as “Russians living in Ukraine.”15 Such a situation was highly 
satisfactory for Russia, as it kept the Ukrainian issue in a desirable context.  
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14 FOM: public opinion foundation, Russia, 1994. 
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As can be seen, Russia did not initially exercise its economic advantage to 
influence Ukrainian economic and political developments, due to an underestimation of 
the political necessity of doing such a thing. 
However, an independent Ukraine was already a fact and relations between 
Russia and Ukraine inevitably led to the establishment and development of the legal base 
for country-to-country relations. Moreover, the Ukraine did not share Moscow’s vision of 
Russia-Ukraine cooperation, and treated those relations like relations with any other 
country. This could bring the level of interaction between the two countries into more 
diplomatic-centered modes, versus local cooperation. Reality compelled Russia to 
transform its attitude to the Ukraine from very familiar to more official. This was the 
point when the Russian political elite realized that Ukraine had become an independent 
member of the world community, not a “younger sister” of a “big brother”. The necessity 
to work out an articulated policy toward the Ukraine has brought into question what to do 
with the Ukraine in order not to lose the former degree of influence. Of course, 
Moscow‘s official position towards Ukraine did not change for the worse, as good-
neighbor relations were still predominant. At the same time, although the bilateral affairs 
were at a qualitatively new level, the diplomatic dialog was still held in the context of the 
imperial seniority of Russia and implied negligibility of Ukrainian interests. All attempts 
by the Ukraine to promote its own views were controlled by Russia, either in direct 
negotiations or through the Commonwealth of Independent States. In other words, having 
realized that something should be done in order to keep Ukraine under control, Russia 
mistakenly tried to exercise its political leadership.  
Russia’s political attempts to influence Ukrainian policy for economic and 
political self-determination significantly worsened political relations between the two 
countries. As Russia increased its efforts to seize the initiative in the bilateral dialog and 
dictate the conditions of cooperation, Ukraine increased its desire to demonstrate 
independence. This did not improve the relationship between the two and made the split 
bigger. Paradoxically, it was not in Russia’s interests, as it made influencing the Ukraine 





Russia then needed to restore its position at least to the level enjoyed after the 
creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. There were two ways to act in 
order to make the Ukraine more attentive to Russia: recognize de facto or partly 
recognize Ukraine’s independence and turn the dialog to a more amicable subject, or use 
compulsion to turn Ukraine back to respect and obedience. If the Russian political 
authorities chose the first, it would mean that Ukraine would obtain real independence 
and Russia would have to admit a “political capitulation”. Influence on Ukraine in this 
case would decline greatly, and control would not be a possibility. This would not match 
Russia’s political interests regarding the former Soviet Republic. The second variant is 
more in accord with Russia’s interests and goals, as it would return Russia to a position 
of power and leadership. However, there were limited points of leverage available. As 
discussed earlier, there were no more political tools to compel Ukraine’s obedience, as 
Ukraine did not want to accept Russia’s patronage. The only way Russia could pursue its 
ambitions in bilateral affairs was to use the Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia, as 
a monopoly source of energy.  
It would then seem very simple to predict political developments in the region. 
The only thing Russia would have to do is use its economic advantage over the Ukraine 
in order to dictate terms, and, of course, the main leverage in this matter would be energy 
– primarily the oil and gas supplies. Predicting this, dialog seems simple: if Ukraine does 
not agree with the political position of Russia, then Russia stops its loyalty towards 
Ukraine in the area of oil and gas supply, which means decreasing amounts of oil and gas 
or increasing prices. As described earlier in chapter II, those schemes were applied by 
Russia in different times, in different situations, with different goals.  
Those attempts to use economic power to influence political developments were 
partly successful. For example, in the case of 1993 Ukraine-Russia Presidential talks, or 
the 1995 creation of a common custom union between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine. However, the Ukraine is still not fully under Russian economic influence. 
Although there is no doubt that certain economic dependence is still a useful tool in 
Russian policy towards Ukraine, it is not as effective as Russia desires. It could not 
influence Ukrainian political behavior, for example, to limit cooperation with the West. 





capacity of transporting oil to buyers. As long as the Ukraine remains on the way 
between Russia and Europe and Asia, the major part of Russian exported oil and gas will 
continue to go through Ukraine.16 There is no way for Russia to fully use oil or gas as 
bargaining leverage, because it affects oil flow to other European countries and creates 
difficulties in trade relationships between Russia and Western countries. In some cases, 
the Ukraine managed to withstand Russian oil blockades with the help of counter 
measures such as transit output and transit prices.  
Another important reason why Russia is having problems using oil blockades 
against Ukraine is the growth of Russian and Ukrainian business and political elites. As 
both Ukraine and Russia chose a market economy versus a planned economy, businesses 
in both countries have been growing constantly during the last five years. Close 
connections have been developed between businesses in both countries. This is especially 
true for the energy sector. For example, the three largest Ukrainian oil-refinery plants are 
owned or partly owned by Russian companies. This is politically significant, because 
most tycoons are very close to the political institutes of their countries. They lobby for 
their own interests and create connections with the same establishments abroad. The main 
inducement for these connections is economic rather than political. Businessmen are not 
always interested in the political issues of their governments, as they only care about their 
goals, which are to do business and make money. Russian businessmen are then rather 
reluctant to follow Russian foreign policy interest in their relations with Ukrainian 
businesses because of risk to business prospects. Thus, the December 1999 to February 
2000 oil blockade showed that the use of such sanctions causes serious internal political 
debates, generated probably by the business elite. All these considerations make it harder 
for Russia to use its economic advantage to influence the Ukraine. 
As can be seen, Russia has not yet been able to use its huge economic potential in 
order to keep the leading position in relations with the Ukraine. At first, Russia lost the 
political lead due to lack of strategy towards the Ukraine as an independent state, and 
second, Russia did not effectively manage its economic power. If Russia were more far-
sighted and gave more attention to the Ukraine issue, it would have combined political 
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cooperation and economical leverage in order to keep the Ukraine under its influence 



























V. UKRAINE’S ALTERNATIVES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ITS ENERGY MARKET AND THE DECREASE OF RUSSIAN 
INFLUENCE 
In previous chapters Russia’s advantage over the Ukraine in terms of the supply 
of energy sources was described and reasons why Russia did not use it in order to achieve 
political goals were discussed. In this section, the current political Russia-Ukraine 
relationship will be examined, and the possibility of further Russian attempts to exercise 
its economic power over the Ukraine and necessity to find new alternatives to Russian 
energy will be analyzed. Ukraine’s prospects for energy market development, as well as 
the political and economic role of the West, will also be analyzed. There are three major 
alternatives for energy market development: continuation of oil, gas, and nuclear fuel 
imports from Russia, further exploration of own natural reserves, and diversification of 
suppliers.  
A. SHOULD THE UKRAINE FIND ALTERNATIVES TO RUSSIAN 
ENERGY SUPPLIES? 
Despite recent changes, Russia still plays a very important, if not decisive, role in 
the Ukrainian economic system. The most crucial area is, of course, energy sources - oil 
and gas supplies in particular. Although Russia was not able to use this economic 
advantage over the last decade, it does not mean that Ukraine’s political self-
determination is safe from Russian infringement. The Presidential elections at the end of 
2004 showed that Russia has not given up its desire to influence Ukraine’s internal 
politics. The Russian President and political establishment provided open support for one 
of the candidates, expressed in a politically inappropriate manner. The Russian President 
personally visited the Ukraine twice in order to demonstrate his backing for the V. 
Yanukovych campaign. Also, several Russian Duma members and the mayor of Moscow 
visited Ukraine with the same message.17 The reason for such close support was evident, 
as it was to prevent the election of V. Yushchenko, whose program did not match 
Russian goals. Partly because of this support, pro-Russian candidate V. Yanukovych was 
able to win the first round and pretended to win the elections. Moreover, when the 
                                                 





election results were called in to question and the political situation in the country was 
close to civil disorder, Russia sent a special forces squad onto Ukrainian soil to protect 
the former President L. Kuchma and his political ally V. Yanukovych, in case of an anti-
government revolt. Russia officially denied this, although there was considerable 
evidence to refute Russia's denial.18 The situation was finally resolved peacefully, and, 
under the pressure of a national-wide strike, re-voting was ordered by the Supreme Court. 
The final result was not in favor of the pro-Russian candidate, as V. Yushchenko won. 
This situation brought new circumstances into Ukrainian-Russian relations.  
First, Russia’s involvement in the election process turned out to be the most 
significant mistake of Russian strategy towards the Ukraine. Indeed, it was politically 
shortsighted to provide full support for an unpopular candidate and put all political 
influence at risk. Moreover, this mistake is seen now not only as a result of incorrect 
policy toward Ukraine, but as a general example of incorrect Russian policy toward all 
former Soviet Republics. As a result, Russia’s regional political prestige suffered a great 
deal.  
Second, this put both countries on the outs. Russia viewed V. Yushchenko as its 
political enemy during the election, the reason being that the ultimately successful 
candidate had a different policy towards Russia and pro-Westernism. After so much 
criticism of V. Yushchenko by Russian politicians, it was much harder to start a friendly 
dialog after his election. Although the first Ukraine-Russia Presidential meetings were 
considered generally successful, the political situation is different now, and this 
difference is not in Russia’s favor. Its political domination of the Ukraine has virtually 
disappeared. 
In order to gain revenge and restore its political power and reputation among 
states of the CIS, Russia needs to regain the initiative. The most effective way to do that 
would be to demonstrate economic power over Ukraine, and place it back in the position 
of being dependent. Ukraine is therefore facing a choice between two general options – to 
continue importing Russian energy at the same degree, or to diversify suppliers. 
                                                 





If there were guarantees that Russia would not again try to use its monopoly 
position to affect Ukrainian internal affairs, the Ukraine would not need to look for 
alternatives to Russian oil, gas, and nuclear reactor fuel. However, the history of Ukraine-
Russia relations demonstrates that there are no guaranties. Ukraine is compelled to 
protect itself from Russia’s economic pressure, and the best way to do so is to obtain 
economic independence. This does not necessarily mean that the Ukraine should not 
import Russian energy supplies, as that is almost impossible, since Russia has the largest 
natural reserves in the region. What it really means is that Ukraine should eliminate the 
Russian monopoly and create a more flexible supply system.    
B. WHAT ARE THE UKRAINIAN ALTERNATIVES TO RUSSIAN 
SUPPLIES? 
In order to eliminate the Russian monopoly on energy supply, the internal 
Ukrainian potential and the regional energy market needs to be analyzed, and the 
available alternatives then need to be determined. There are two major directions from 
which non-Russian oil and gas might come to the Ukraine: the Caspian Sea region and 
the Asian countries of OPEC. 
Geographically, Ukraine has transport systems connecting the transportation 
infrastructures of Europe, Asia, Russia, and the countries of the Caspian Sea basin. The 
Ukraine connects sea-lanes to pipelines and railways. This location advantage might be 
enhanced through further development of transportation systems. To do this, Ukraine 
would need to develop cooperation with both energy producers and energy consumers. In 
connecting both sides, Ukraine would have an advantageous position in seeking energy 
imports. 
Considering the tough competition in the energy and transportation industries, 
Ukraine might not be able to quickly achieve the goal of a strong position in oil and gas 
transportations between countries of Asia and Europe. Therefore, several different 
alternatives could be developed and implemented simultaneously. Simply buying from 
the countries of the Caspian Sea basin or OPEC would be another option.  
Nuclear energy alternatives could also focus on diversification. Finding 
alternatives to Russia’s nuclear fuel supply and reprocessing of wastes (with the help of 





Further exploration of internal reserves is of no small importance. Although 
Ukraine is not a country with huge natural reserves, its proven stocks of oil, gas, and 
especially coal are sufficient for internal demand if they can be fully developed. 
All the prospects for energy market development are mostly for the long run, and 
require a consistent, patient strategy. Ukrainian authorities should consider simultaneous 
development of all possible measures for energy diversification.  
1. Caspian Sea Region Reserves19  
The Caspian region contains a huge amount of untapped natural reserves of gas 
and oil. The region’s total oil reserves may reach 60 to 200 billion barrels. This would be 
enough to satisfy Europe’s demand for more than a decade. Natural gas reserves of the 
region are estimated at 232 to 236 trillion cubic feet, which is comparable to Saudi 
Arabia. Much of these reserves are located in the Caspian Sea on the territories of 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Due to underdevelopment of 
regional capacities and distance from major manufacturers of continental shelf drilling 
equipment, oil production remains very low. In 1995, for example, the region produced 
only 870,000 barrels per day.  
However, the major problem is Ukraine's geographical and political isolation. 
Geographical isolation is due to natural obstacles, such as seas on the west, and 
mountains on the south and the east. North of this region is Russia. Almost all of the 
existing pipelines built during the Soviet era are directed to the north or west, where 
Russia controls connecting lines. There is a low-capacity connection to the east or south.  
The political situation does not favor the development of the region. It is 
surrounded by countries that are politically unstable or under sanctions (e.g. Afghanistan, 
Iran, and Iraq). Moreover, each of the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
themselves face difficult political challenges. They are all transitional countries and 
politically unstable. Caspian regional pipeline infrastructures are vulnerable to regional 
conflicts. Numerous ethnic and religious groups inhabit the Caspian Sea region, and 
continuing conflicts pose threats to pipelines, including those under construction. The 
                                                 






Azerbaijan-Armenia war over the Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh enclave in 
Azerbaijan has yet to be resolved. Separatist conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and 
Ajaria in Georgia flared in mid-1990, and the Abkhazia conflict has escalated to the 
international level. Another feature of the regional instability is Russia's war with 
Chechnya, which has devastated the region around Groznyy in southern Russia. The 
September 2004 terrorist act in Beslan demonstrated the strained political situation in the 
Caspian Sea region.  
Political isolation is increased by Russian policy towards former Soviet 
Republics. As stated earlier, Russia is not interested in the development of relations of 
any kind between near-Russia and other countries. Also, as Russia is a country of the 
Caspian Sea basin, it is interested in exploration of Caspian natural reserves only within 
its own territory. With the control over pipelines coming from the region to the West, 
Russia would not be willing to give access for oil to western markets. Additionally, the 
capacity of the pipelines would not be enough to transport all of the available oil. There is 
no easy way for oil and gas to leave the Caspian region. Therefore, if increased exports 
are desired, new routes must be created.  
There are several available oil development projects to be considered. One of 
them is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (PCP) project that consists of a 1000-mile 
pipeline connecting the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of 
Novorossiysk. Construction began in 1999 and was mostly completed in 2001. The PCP 
was fully operational in 2003, and in 2004, had already reached a capacity of 22.5 million 
tons a year. The crude oil is transported from Novorossiysk to Mediterranean and world 
markets through the Bosporus. This project was the largest single investment in the 
Caspian region by U.S. petroleum companies, including ChevronTexaco and 
ExxonMobil.  
The other project is likewise partially connected to Novorossiysk and sponsored 
by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, a consortium of ten foreign oil 
companies, including four American companies (Unocal, ExxonMobil, Amoco, and 
Pennzoil). There are two lines developed by this project. One line crosses the North 





Sup’sa. The crude oil is then transported through Bosporus to the world market. During 
the first half of 2004, the Azerbaijan International Operating Company exported about 36 
million barrels of oil.  
A third oil transportation project takes oil from Azerbaijan to the world market. 
The construction of the 1,040-mile pipeline form Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port 
of Ceyhan, via Georgia, is scheduled to be completed and operational in the summer of 
2005. This route is called the “Main Export Pipeline”. One of the distinguishing features 
of this project is that oil will bypass the increasingly crowded Bosporus Strait and go 
directly to the Mediterranean (at Ceyhan). This project has faced numerous challenges. 
At the beginning, the pipeline was regarded as technically infeasible because of its 
extended distance through rugged terrain. Now the project developers face criticism from 
non-governmental organizations for being environmentally hazardous, threatening 
archeological treasures and violating human rights.  
Although gas reserves in the Caspian Sea are greater than oil, companies and 
governments of this region have shown more interest in oil export development. This is 
due to lack of existing infrastructure for gas operations and great capital expenditures 
needed for gas pipeline construction. There is only one new major gas project of 
significance for the regional market, and its known as the South Caucasus Pipeline. This 
gas pipeline (from Baku, Azerbaijan to Erzurum, Turkey, through Tbilisi, Georgia) will 
run parallel to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline for most of its length before 
connecting to the Turkish gas line infrastructure near the town of Erzurum. Estimated 
initial capacity of this pipe is 1.5 billion cubic feet per day. The pipeline is planned to be 
expanded to 3 billion cubic feet per day in 2007, and is scheduled for exports to Turkey 
in August 2006. 
As is evident, exploration and exploitation of Caspian Sea natural reserves are not 
yet fully developed. Further increases in production and export of oil and gas from this 
region will require new transportation infrastructure. Most likely, the future means of 
carrying oil and gas will be new pipelines from the Caspian Sea to the Russian and 
Georgian Black Sea ports. These seem to be more preferred than construction of south-





western direction appears to be more secure. Russia is more capable of securing pipelines 
than its Caspian neighbors. Georgia, after its democratic reforms and establishment of a 
new government, became more politically stable. There are then several ways for further 
transit, such as to Black Sea ports across the sea in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Ukraine, or to the Mediterranean through Turkey’s Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. 
However, the seaway from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean is of growing concern. 
The government of Turkey and numerous non-governmental organizations have voiced 
concerns about the ecological situation around the Black and Marmora Seas. Highly 
increased sea transport traffic through the Bosporus Strait increases the possibility of 
pollution, especially with more petroleum tankers. Turkey has already announced its 
intention to limit operations in this crucially important transport node. With these 
increased security measures, the exploitation of the straits is becoming slower and more 
costly. Thus, the Black Sea outlet is becoming limited for sea transportation, and port-to-
port connections within the Black Sea boundaries gain in importance. Four Black Sea 
ports connect seaways to pipelines. They are: Turkish Kliyikoy, Bulgarian Burgas, 
Romanian Constantia, and Ukrainian Odessa.  
A proposal to build a pipeline that would be an alternative to Turkish straits was 
communicated to Turkey by Russia. A consortium known as the Thrace Development 
initially put this idea forward. The connection between the Black Sea port of Kliyikoy 
and the Aegean Sea port of Ibricbaba would bypass the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits 
with a capacity of 1 million barrels per day. An alternative to this project proposal is a 1-
million-bbl/d line from the Black Sea port of Samsun in northeastern Turkey to Ceyhan. 
However, Turkey might not be interested in the construction of bypasses. The reason is 
that the Turkish Straits serve mostly as a transportation channel for countries of the Black 
Sea basin other than Turkey itself, and because Turkey has enough connections between 
the Black Sea and the Mediterranean over land.  
The proposed Bulgaria-Macedonia-Albania oil pipeline project would have 570 
miles of pipes and a capacity of 750 thousand barrels per day. It would start from the 
Bulgarian port of Burgas and lead to the Albanian Adriatic port of Vlore. Although 
proposed since 1994, it is still not operational. Pipeline backers cite several reasons for 





wait for a clear connection to the Caspian Sea region, and the poor condition of all three 
refineries in Albania (two are closed, and the third is barely functional).  
Another Russian proposal in 1997 was to construct a much shorter pipeline 
connecting the port of Burgas and the Greek Aegean Sea port of Alexandropoulos. This 
178-mile underground pipeline would allow Russia to export oil via the Black Sea, while 
bypassing the Bosporus Strait, with a capacity of 300 thousand barrels per day. However, 
a wide range of technical and economic issues has slowed the project. Although Russia, 
Greece, and Bulgaria signed a memorandum of general agreement in November 2004, 
they did not complete a memorandum of understanding by the end of the year as was 
planned. The reason was partly Russia’s support of the Bulgaria-Macedonia-Albania oil 
pipeline. Greece initiated further negotiations for construction of the pipeline in early 
2005, with the final signing of a memorandum of understanding expected in summer 
2005. Arguments about the necessity for both the Bugas-Vlore and Burgas-
Alexandroupolis pipelines may result in a construction of only one of them.  
Another pipeline project, known as the Constantia-Omisalj-Trieste Pipeline or 
South-East European Line, would connect the Romanian Black Sea Port of Constantia 
with Italy's Adriatic port city of Trieste. Proposed by Romania, it would extend across 
Romania to the Serbian town of Pancevo (near Belgrade), where it will connect to an 
existing branch of the Adria pipeline that runs across Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to Trieste. Although a previous planned proposed that the pipeline would 
end at the Croatian Adriatic port of Omisalj, Croatia initiated a revision for the route due 
to environmental concerns. Countries along the route plan to incorporate existing 
connections between Constantia and regional refineries, which will enable them to use 
the pipeline. In November 2004, the governments of Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Italy, and Austria agreed to endorse the South-East European Line and 
its connection with the Transalpine pipeline. Transalpine supplies refineries in Austria, 
Germany and the Czech Republic. Construction is scheduled to start in late 2005, with a 
capacity of 480 thousand barrels per day by 2007. 
2. The Role of the Odessa-Brody Pipeline 
With all the positive features of projects listed so far, there is one very important 





Ukraine has an advantageous position with the Odessa-Brody pipeline and oil terminal 
“Yuznuy” (“South”) connecting the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa with the city of 
Brody. Exploitation of this pipeline would serve several purposes simultaneously: 
reducing the amount of oil transported by tankers through the Turkish Straits; acquiring 
oil from countries of the Caspian region; reducing Ukrainian dependence on Russian oil; 
and developing economic relationships with countries of Central and Western Europe. 
Unfortunately, since the completion of the first part of the pipeline in 2001, there have 
been numerous controversies about how to use it.  
Initially, the new oil pipeline was intended as a means for the transit of Caspian 
oil to Europe. Oil transported from the ports of Georgia and Russia were supposed to be 
stored in the oil terminal “Yuznuy”, near the port of Odessa, and then pumped towards 
the Ukrainian–Polish border, going through Brody where the pipeline “Druzba” 
(“Friendship”) intersects. Then, Caspian oil would go in one of two directions, to 
Hungary and Slovakia via “Druzba”, or to Polish border city of Plotsk (with a further link 
to the Baltic port of Gdansk) via the Odessa-Brody pipeline (expanded to the northwest). 
After the completion of the first pipeline segment between Odessa and Brody in 2001, 
with the capacity at 180 thousand barrels per day,20 the Ukraine was unable to obtain a 
sufficient amount of oil from Caspian suppliers to operate the pipeline profitably. As a 
result, it was inactive until 2004. During the Kuchma regime, there were several talks 
with the governments of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan about oil supplies for the Odessa-
Brody pipeline. However, the Ukraine could not offer financial incentives attractive 
enough for the Kazakh and Azeri side.  
There are two possible explanations for this that might be considered. The first is 
a purely economical reason, as the parties might have discovered insufficient 
profitability. Although there were no calculations published, the existence of such 
calculations is possible. The refusal to supply crude oil to the Ukrainian pipeline might be 
based on the difference in profit that Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan might get from the 
transportation through Ukraine and profit they already receive from supplies to the 
Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. However, this explanation contradicts common 
                                                 





sense, as oil transported through pipelines from the Black Sea to European countries 
should obviously be cheaper than oil transported by tankers through the Turkish Straits, 
and then through the Adriatic, to European countries. Attempts to describe Odessa-Brody 
as unprofitable might rather be a result of another reason – political.  
It is obvious that the Kuchma regime was not interested in exploiting the pipeline 
in its original direction, but was more interested to reach an agreement with Russia. 
Russia opposed the use of Ukrainian assets for transit of Caspian oil. Russian oil 
companies proposed to use Odessa-Brody in a reverse direction (from Brody to Odessa) 
in order to transport Russian oil through the Black sea to world markets. Russia’s 
interests in the proposal are obvious, as it would increase Russian oil outflow; and at the 
same time, the Ukraine would still depend on Russian oil, instead of having a Caspian 
supply. Also, the Odessa-Brody pipeline, carrying Caspian oil to Europe and the Baltic 
Sea through Poland, is a rival to Russia’s oil, and would decrease dependence on Russian 
oil for this region. In this context, Russia will do everything possible to prevent 
completion of further parts of the pipeline and use of the existing part in a westerly 
direction. Thus, there is clear Russian influence on the Azerbaijani position in this matter. 
Initially interested in cooperation, the President of the Azerbaijani State Oil Company 
SOCAR stated in May 2004: “Azerbaijan will not participate in this project and we do 
not plan to join the project in the future.”21 The official reason for this was mentioned as 
participation in another oil pipeline project known as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan.  
The official Ukrainian position on the purpose of the Odessa-Brody pipeline has 
vacillated over the last four years. Initially, there were no other possible uses for Odessa-
Brody other than the west direction. The main talks with the Kazakh side were held with 
participation of ChevronTexaco, which has a significant share in Kazakh oil production 
as well as the capability of transporting oil to the Black Sea. In April 2004, the Ukrainian 
government confirmed its desire to use the pipeline in the original direction. On April 17, 
Deputy Prime Minister for fuel and energy A. Klyuyev agreed with Kazakh Prime 
Minister D. Akhemot to supply Kazakh oil to refineries in Ukraine and to use Ukrainian's 
transport capacity to export to Europe.  
                                                 





The expected amount of oil pumped through Odessa-Brody was to be 2 million 
tons a year. However, this agreement has ceased because nothing was done by the 
Ukrainian side to fulfill it. As was known later, A. Klyuyev with Chairman of Naftogas 
Ukrainy, O.Boyko, and the head of Ukrtransnafta, S. Vasilenko, were the strongest 
supporters of V. Yanukovych during the Presidential campaign. Then, as the Ukrainian 
Presidential campaign started, the offer from Russia made more sense to the ruling 
regime of Kuchma. On July 5, 2004, the government removed the legal limits on 
transporting oil through the Odessa-Brody pipeline exclusively in one direction. A bit 
later, on July 26-27, “Ukrtransnafta” announced that it accepted an offer from Russian-
British consortium TNK-BP to ship oil from Brody south to Odessa and then by tankers 
to seaways.22 Moreover, according to the agreement, if the Ukrainian side decided to stop 
this transit and redirect it, it would have to repay the credits. Later reports confirmed that 
the amount of oil transited through Odessa did not correspond to the planned output of 
180 thousand barrels per day. During 2004, only half of the expected amount was 
transported. This would make the Odessa-Brody pipeline unprofitable for Russia. 
However, Russia continued to use it in 2005, with an announced plan to pump through 
only 90 thousand barrels per day, which is half of the original promise. Therefore, this 
pipeline is highly expensive and unprofitable for Russia. The fact that Russia still uses it 
is evidence of Russian interest in keeping this line busy with reverse oil flow.  
After the new President of Ukraine, V. Yushchenko, came into office, the new 
administration indicated a preference for the Odessa-Brody pipeline to be used in the 
west direction. About a month later, the new Prime Minister, Y. Tymoshenko, claimed 
that reverse exploitation of Odessa-Brody was unprofitable and unfavorable for Ukraine, 
and that the government would quickly resolve this problem. At the same time, during his 
visit to Moscow in January 2005, President Yushchenko stated that the pipeline would 
temporarily continue to operate in reverse mode.23 However, he clarified, that this 
decision had become inevitable last year, for lack of direct access to Caspian oil. 
Although it is contrary to the initial purpose of the pipeline, it seems to be reasonable for 
now, since Ukraine is still bound by the previous agreement, and oil inflow from the 
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Caspian Sea is not established. Two days later, President Yushchenko visited Poland, 
where a preliminary agreement was reached in regards to the pipeline extension to Plotsk 
in Poland. Since then, the Ukrainian position seems to be consistent in its intention to use 
the pipeline for delivery of oil to Europe from the East when the extension to Poland is 
completed.  
European businesses voiced their interests in the Odessa-Brody extension and 
exploitation in a western direction. Thus, the European Investment Bank announced its 
potential willingness to help in project financing. The European Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development has also offered its assistance in the pipeline extension into Poland and 
even to Germany, to utilize the connection at Brody with “Druzba” to Central Europe. 
After the Prime Ministers of Ukraine and Georgia announced together a joint agreement 
to use Odessa-Brody in the west direction, the project took on greater meaning. It was 
now a plan to use Georgian Black Sea ports for oil transport to Odessa.  
Those last developments concerning pipeline Odessa-Brody show that the 
Ukrainian government seriously considers, for the first time, taking real measures 
directed at weakening Ukrainian dependence on Russia for crude oil. If the Ukrainian 
government follows a consistent policy and is able to finish the project of Caspian oil 
transit to the Ukraine and then to Europe, the alignment of economic and political forces 
in the region will change. For Ukraine, this will mean a decrease of Russian political 
influence.  
3. The Countries of OPEC 
Another alternative energy source for the Ukraine is the nearest countries of 
OPEC. Buying oil and gas from the Middle East is not a new idea. Since independence, 
the Ukraine sought contacts with Iran, Libya, and Iraq for supplies and transportation of 
oil and gas. After 2003, war started, and Iraq was no longer viewed as a potential partner. 
However, relationships between the Ukraine and Iran and Libya are still developing.  
The first practical results were reached in 2001, when Ukrainian Foreign Minister 
A. Zlenko visited Iran with a proposal to construct a gas pipeline to transport natural gas 
from Iran to Western Europe through the Ukraine. At the time, a general agreement was 





the 2004 Presidential elections, the new Ukrainian government stated that negotiations 
with Iran would be intensified. In March 2005, the third meeting of the two countries’ 
energy commissions was held in Kiev. During this meeting, the Ukrainian Deputy 
Minister of Energy announced the Ukraine’s intention to buy 15 million cubic meters of 
gas annually from Iran if the pipeline is built. The proposed routes for the future line are 
either Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Black Sea-Ukraine or Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Russia-
Ukraine. As a next step, a meeting of experts is scheduled to be held in Tehran in May 
2005 to discuss financing. The two countries will then make the final decision. The 
Ukraine has also expressed its desire to take part in Iranian oil exploration using 
Ukrainian assets, and has called for further cooperation in the oil and gas sectors.  
However, cooperation with Libya appears to be even more promising. On October 
10, 2004, Naftogas Ukrayny and Libya’s National Oil Corporation signed a production 
sharing agreement. Under this document, Naftogas Ukrayny would take part in the 
development of four oil and gas fields in Libya, covering 200 thousand square kilometers 
with estimated reserves of 110 million tons of oil and 30 billion cubic meters of gas. 
Naftogas had committed to invest about $58 million in this project. However, the Libyan 
government did not ratify the agreement. New rules were applied for the fields’ 
exploration and now 44 lots will be offered for open international tender. In April 2005, a 
Ukrainian delegation visited Tripoli and discussed further Ukraine-Libya cooperation in 
the energy sector, with successful results. Both countries agreed to cooperate in oil and 
gas exploration, and Ukraine will take part in international tender as a reliable partner in 
Eastern Europe. The parties have also discussed the possibility of Libyan crude oil supply 
to Ukraine by tankers via the Turkish straights of Bosporus and Dardanelles.  
4. Internal Exploration24 
One of the priorities in developing the Ukrainian energy sector is further 
exploration of internal oil and gas reserves. Although Ukrainian oil and gas resources are 
not competitive to those of the Caspian Sea region, exploration and efficient use might 
decrease dependence on Russian energy recourses.  
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According to geological data, the Ukrainian Black Sea shelves carry 1.5 billion 
tons of conventional fuel in the form of gas and oil. Unfortunately, only 3 percent of full 
capacity has been explored. Naftogas Ukrainy has planned oil and gas development in the 
shelves of Black Sea and the Sea of Azov through 2015. The leading exploration 
company in this region is Chornomornaftogas, which has five active oil and gas fields on 
the sea shelves and is scheduled to begin exploration of another four fields over the next 
three years. However, even successful exploration and development of those additional 
fields will not increase the average Ukrainian oil and gas production levels, because new 
reserves will just replace the old fields that are now in the last phases of exploitation. To 
increase gas and oil production significantly, the Ukraine needs large, long-term financial 
investments. As the controlling interest in Naftogas Ukrainy belongs to the government, 
and the Ukraine does not have sufficient financial capacity to make such investments, this 
problem will probably persist. Partial privatization of exploration assets would probably 
help solve the problem, however, with the potential of the Caspian Sea region, it is hard 
to find any party interested in Ukrainian projects other then Russia. Again, privatization 
of Ukrainian exploration would only deepen Russia’s monopoly on the energy supply to 
Ukraine. Therefore, further exploration of internal Ukrainian reserves is a limited option 
for now. Nevertheless, existing recourses should be considered as future strategic means 
for Ukrainian energy systems.  
5. Nuclear Fuel25 
Although electricity production in Ukraine exceeds internal demand, a 
diversification in nuclear fuel supply is needed due to the Russian monopoly in this 
sector. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine negotiated to repatriate 
nuclear warheads and missiles to Russia in return for nuclear fuel supplies. After that, 
Russia became the sole supplier of nuclear fuel and nuclear cycle services. Currently, the 
Russian Corporation TVEL supplies all the fuel used by all fifteen Ukrainian reactors.  
Although Ukraine’s dependence on Russian fuel rods and nuclear after-processing 
have not been exploited so far, it is quite possible in the future. The Ukraine’s national 
security interests indicate the necessity of diversification. As the Ukraine tries to 
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minimize Russian economic influence, it should consider all possible means for such 
influence, as nuclear power plants produce nearly 50 percent of Ukrainian electricity, and 
it would be highly advantageous for Russia to control it. 
The Ukraine considers the U.S. as an alternative nuclear fuel supplier. In 2003, 
the joint Ukraine-U.S. project was started, for adapting American nuclear fuel for use in 
Ukrainian Atomic-Electro-Stations (Ukrainian title for nuclear power plant). In October 
2004, representatives from Westinghouse completed installation of the nuclear 
assemblies monitoring system in the Pivdennoukrainska power plant. In the summer of 
2005, this station will begin experimental use of six Westinghouse-made nuclear 
cartridges. If testing is successful, a future agreement will be reached on a supply of 160 
more fuel rods from the U.S. 
Additionally, Ukraine remains dependent on Russia for reprocessing spent nuclear 
fuel. Until 1998, all spent nuclear fuel from Ukraine’s reactors was sent to special storage 
facilities in the Krasnoyarsk and Mayak plants for reprocessing. In 1998, there was an 
instance when the Russian reprocessing plant in Krasnoyarsk city refused to take, for 
reprocessing, 40 tons of spent fuel from the Ukrainian Zaporozhska nuclear power plant. 
The claim was that the price of reprocessing was too low. Since then, the price has 
increased from $285 to $330 per kilogram. In 1998-1999, shipments of spent nuclear fuel 
to Russia cost Ukraine around $100 million a year. After 1998, Ukraine started storing 
spent nuclear fuel on Ukrainian territory instead of reprocessing it in Russia. According 
to the Ukrainian Fuel and Energy Ministry, dry storage in Ukraine is 10 times cheaper 
than sending it to Russia. The first Ukrainian dry storage facility was put in operation 
near the Zaporozhye power plant in September 2001, with a total of 380 containers 
having service lives of 50 years. Each container can be loaded with 22 spent fuel 
assemblies and weighs over 20 tons.  
In 2004, the Ukraine announced a tender for the design and construction of spent 
nuclear fuel storage facilities with participation from six firms: Framatome ANP 
(France), Atomstroyexport (Russia), Holtec consortium (U.S.), BNFL (UK), consortium 
of JNS (Germany), and Novokramatorsk machine-building plant (Ukraine). Holtec won 





2008. The capacity of the project’s first stage will be 3,580 spent fuel assemblies from 
various reactor types. It is estimated that the facility will receive 720 assemblies annually. 
Successful completion of theses projects would improve the Ukrainian position relative 
to Russian nuclear fuel and its reprocessing capacity.  
C. SUMMARY  
In conclusion, for this chapter, the three major alternatives for Ukrainian energy 
market development will be reviewed and the most appropriate solution for Ukraine will 
be surmised. As mentioned earlier, the three major alternatives are: continuation of oil, 
gas, and nuclear fuel imports from Russia; further exploration of own natural reserves; 
and diversification of suppliers.  
Continuation of oil, gas, and nuclear fuel imports from only Russia is not an 
appropriate option for Ukraine. From an economic perspective, this option has two 
aspects. One is that further involvement of Russian energy companies in the Ukrainian 
market would help Ukraine develop its energy infrastructure and bring in financial 
investments needed for reforming. The second aspect is that Russia will have even 
stronger economic control over the Ukrainian energy market, such as full price control 
and quantitative regulation. Politically, this option is not an acceptable one for Ukraine 
either. The reason for that is the use of economic advantage by Russia in bilateral 
political relationships. During the last decade, Russia has used economic leverages to 
apply political pressure to Ukraine several times. Now the possibility of an attempt to 
influence Ukraine is increased, because Russia does not share the political position of the 
new Ukrainian government.  
Further exploration of internal natural reserves would be a good option if Ukraine 
had the financial capabilities or adequate foreign investors. However, in opening up the 
energy market, Ukraine risks greater monopolization, as the most interested investors for 
Ukraine’s energy are Russian companies. This would only strengthen Ukrainian 
dependence on Russian energy sources. So, for national economic security reasons, 
Ukraine should assure that foreign investments are attracted not only from Russia. Due to 
the Caspian Sea potential and unstable security for foreign businesses in Ukraine, this is 





option for now. However, Ukraine should consider existing recourses as a future strategy 
for energy systems development, and ought to begin to find efficient ways to explore it. 
The diversification of energy suppliers is the most acceptable option for Ukraine. 
Only this would eliminate the Russian monopoly on supply and decrease its economic 
influence. Ukraine should consider two major alternatives on oil and gas supplies: 
Caspian Sea region countries and OPEC countries. As Ukraine has a good potential 
capacity of energy transit from Asia to Europe, it has to use the advantage of this. The 
diversification of nuclear fuel supply requires further development of cooperation with 
countries of nuclear power.  
Finding alternatives for oil, gas, and nuclear fuel supplies does not necessarily 
mean that the Ukraine should aspire to stop importation of Russian energy supplies, as 
that is impossible, since Russia has the largest natural reserves in the region. However, 
the main goal of such diversification is the development of a flexible energy supply 





























VI. REFORMATION OF UKRAINIAN ENERGY HIERARCHY 
Reformation of the Ukrainian energy industry is an important part of energy 
market development in Ukraine. Several steps can be taken to reform the energy sector: 
restructuring and efficiency improvement, reducing corruption, and attracting Western 
investors.  
In the oil and gas sector structure, it can be seen that the industry is highly 
concentrated. Ukraine’s largest energy company is the state oil and gas holding company, 
Naftogas Ukrainy. The significance of that company for the Ukrainian economy is 
indicated by its accounting for 19 percent of government revenue and 15 percent of GDP. 
Naftogas Ukrainy is at the top of a variegated pyramid of sub-companies and 
subcontractors presented in Figure 1. Through its subsidiaries, ChornomorNaftogas, 
Ukrtransnafta and Ukrtransgas, it controls the oil and gas pipeline network. Ukrtransnafta 
in turn has further subsidiaries, pipeline operations companies named Pridniprovsky and 
Druzba. Other subsidiaries of Naftogas Ukrainy, Ukrnafta and Ukrgasextract, are oil and 
gas exploration companies that develop offshore fields in the Black Sea and the Sea of 
Azov. Uknafta itself also has a highly developed infrastructure. It is responsible for 93 
percent of the country’s oil production, 40 percent of its gas condensate, and 18 percent 
of its natural gas. It controls 100 oil and gas fields in the Carpathian, Donetsk, and 
Dnipro regions, and also owns three gas processing plants and a network of filling 
stations. In total, Naftogas Ukrainy has twenty direct and mediated subsidiaries.  
The inefficient and centralized organization of the industry facilitates state-
connected corruption. President Kuchma’s government initiated the formation of the 
vertically integrated oil company, on the basis of the state’s shares in oil-producing and 
oil-refining firms. Initially, the company was to be organized on the basis of the assets of 
Ukrnafta. However, after the urging of the chairman of Naftogas Ukrainy Y.Boyko (a 
very influential person who has business and political connections), the final decision 




















Figure 1. Organizational structure of Naftogas Ukrayny26 
 
Thus, restructuring of the Ukraine’s gas and oil monopoly and the selective 
replacement of existing management are the most effective ways to improve efficiency 
and reduce corruption in the energy industry. The first step in this process was the 
replacement of Y.Boyko in March 2005. Also, over the last several years, the 
Yushchenko government has begun re-analysis of privatization initiatives. There are also 
several investigations going on in regards to the legitimacy of sales, when government 
members or their relatives privatized state assets at understated costs. These include 
privatizations or resale of oil refineries to Russia-related owners.  
Special attention should also be devoted to the so-called Private Group, a group of 
businessmen supported by Private-Bank assets, formed in 1992. It holds 42 percent of 
Ukrnafta shares, and is the sole owner of one refinery and is partnered with Russian 
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companies to control two more refineries. Private Group’s corporate structure is not clear, 
as it has shares also in metallurgy and banking, and uses a number of offshore 
subsidiaries as ownership members. During the Kuchma regime, the Private Group was 
believed to have government backing. Thus, Ukrnafta was practically controlled by 
Private-Bank, even though 50 percent plus 1 share belongs to state. However, the group’s 
leadership was flexible enough to remain out of the political struggle during the Orange 
Revolution. The only completed action is a supply of winter shoes for strikers in Kiev, 
which can now be counted as a political asset for the Private Group. Nevertheless, with 
new government policy, Private Group might be in conflict with the Yushchenko 
administration.  
Restructuring and reformation is also urgently needed for the coal industry of 
Ukraine. State coal reserves are more than enough to satisfy internal demand, but 
production levels are low. The main reason is high inefficiency of more than half of the 
operating coalmines. The industry survives only with the help of heavy government 
subsidies. However, even those subsidies are not enough for industry development. 
About one third of all mines in Ukraine have outdated equipment, a lack of spare parts, 
and poor safety procedures. Most mines belong to state-owned coal enterprises, and are 
run by managers appointed by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. During the Kuchma 
administration, people who were connected to the so-called "Donetsk business clan", an 
informal group of business and political leaders reputed to be highly corrupted, headed 
these institutions. The Ukrainian Coal Ministry was described in a December 1998 World 
Bank report as follows: "Arranging barter trades and bombarding the Finance Ministry 
and cabinet with requests for additional investment funds and production subsidies 
became the main occupation of the Coal Ministry."27  
Partial privatization of the coal industry did not lead to positive results, as the 
government was willing to sell only unprofitable mines with little potential. Thus, a 
possible solution for the problem would be to close all non-productive mines and use the 
released resources in profitable or promising mines, re-equipping and modernizing them 
in order to increase production. However, such a solution creates more problems, as 
                                                 





closing mines are highly expensive and a hundred thousand people would be left 
unemployed in areas without job opportunities. 
As can be seen, the reformation of the Ukrainian energy systems structure is an 
important part of the development of the internal energy market. It is one of the biggest 
challenges of the new Ukrainian government. A consistent internal policy towards energy 
systems is a key aspect in the process of improving efficiency, reducing corruption and 
attracting Western investors. The success in these processes will play a critical 





VII. THE U.S. ROLE  
The interests of the United States in Ukraine have several deeply intertwined 
aspects. Almost every issue in which the U.S. has interests in this part of the world is 
connected to Ukraine: expansion of the political influence in countries of the former 
Soviet Union with containment of Russian influence, interest in the energy resources of 
the Caspian Sea region, and Iran isolation.  
Due to its geographical location, the Ukraine is in a very important strategic 
position. The interplay of U.S., Russian and Ukrainian interests has been one of the most 
complicated and delicate policy concerns for the region. On the one hand, the Ukraine is 
key to the Russian policy of keeping its neighbors close.  On the other hand, the U.S. is 
interested in the Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, which would weaken the Russian 
position in the region. Thus, the Ukraine is not only a “buffer zone” between European 
countries and Russia, but also between U.S. and Russian interests in the region. The U.S. 
vision of the Ukraine as a politically independent state free of Russian influence is not 
consistent with tight economic ties between Russia and the Ukraine. The Ukraine, in turn, 
understands the importance of maintaining good relations with both Russia and the U.S. 
The Ukraine is interested in developing relationships with the EU, WTO, and NATO, but 
it also realizes the importance of its complex relationship with Russia. This compels 
Ukraine to avoid permanently taking any side. The best solution for the U.S. would be 
full Ukrainian economic independence. This coincides with Ukrainian's economic policy 
towards Russia. Thus, the U.S. might be very supportive of Ukrainian projects for energy 
supply diversification. 
Coincidently, the U.S. support for the Ukrainian desire to become a transit 
corridor for Caspian oil and gas also responds to another political issue, Iran. One of the 
possible alternative routes for Caspian energy sources lies through Iran. However, 
Washington opposes Iranian involvement in the Caspian. Thus, as it was concluded 
earlier, the most advantageous route for energy transit is through the Ukraine.  
Although U.S. support for Ukrainian energy projects would respond to both the 





government is regarded as pro-Western and has started to actively promote cooperation 
with the EU, the U.S and NATO. However, active courting of Western involvement 
might anger Russia and escalate the situation. So, if the U.S. hastens to side with the 
Ukraine now, it might be involved in an unwanted confrontation with Russia. A more 
unfortunate option would be involvement in a confrontation should the Ukraine promise 
to join NATO. On the other hand, if the U.S. and the West leave the Ukraine on its own, 
the Ukraine may not withstand Russian pressure, and fall under its economical and 
political control again. A similar situation occurred in 1992-1993. At that time, the newly 
independent countries were deciding which way to choose for future development. There 
were two general possibilities. The first was union on an economic basis, since the 
elements of the Soviet economic system were highly interrelated and relatively isolated 
from other countries. The second was deeper political and economic division. Unlike 
other countries of former Soviet Union, the Ukraine was more amenable to the second 
variant, because there was a massive wave of active anti-communist and anti-Soviet 
sentiments.  
Those movements took the shape of an anti-Russian dominance on post-Soviet 
territory. Many in the new government were Ukraine nationalists from the western parts 
of the country. At that time, western influence could play a very important role. However, 
U.S. policy towards Ukraine (and other former Soviet Republics) at was not proactive. 
The U.S. and the West generally took the “wait-and-see” position and did not risk 
interference. Russian economic and political dominance was soon reasserted, supporters 
of a pro-Russian direction came to power, and the turning point passed. If the West had 
undertaken more efforts to gear Ukrainian foreign policy towards the West, it would have 
quite possibly significantly changed the current alignment of nations. 
Today, the U.S. might adopt a more flexible policy toward Ukraine, supporting 
economic sovereignty and energy projects but holding off full political and military 
backing. First results would indicate further developments, as the U.S. might draw the 
appropriate conclusions and rebuild its policy accordingly. Now is a very good time for 
such tactics, because today, Ukraine has the most reform-minded government it has ever 





VIII. WHILE THIS THESIS WAS IN PROGRESS 
While this thesis was written, some connected developments occurred. Some of 
them changed the situation of the Ukrainian energy systems, and some just reinforced 
already existing conditions.  
The Ukrainian government announced regulations on petroleum product prices, 
specifically on diesel fuel and gasoline.28 This decision followed the sudden price 
increase by several distributing companies simultaneously. At first, the State 
Antimonopoly Committee requested substantiation for this price change and also called 
those firms to produce evidence of competition among them. After several companies 
failed to explain their price formation policies, the Antimonopoly Committee launched 
several investigations against the following companies: “Linos” (Russian capital), TNK-
BP Ukraine (Russia-Britain), Lukoil Ukraine (Ukraine-Russia), Litasko Ukraine, and 
Lukoil-Odessa (Ukrainian–Russian capital). All of those companies distribute or process 
oil imported from Russia. In the case of a proven price fixing agreement among the 
petroleum products distributors, they will each be fined up to 10 percent of their 2004 
revenue. The Minister of Economy stated that the government and he personally do not 
support an administrative style in controlling the economy. However, the situation is such 
that a few foreign distributors control the Ukrainian oil distribution market. In this case, a 
regulatory regime is the only possible defense of Ukrainian national interests.  
At the end of April 2005, Turkey refused to provide Bosporus and Dardanelle 
Strait access to oil tankers from Libya to the Ukraine.29 The official reason for the refusal 
was concern about environmental conditions in the straits. Turkey tries to minimize 
traffic through its channels, especially oil tankers, due to the immediate vicinity of 
several Turkish large cities and a high risk of oil spills. This decision lessens Ukrainian 
efforts to minimize its dependence on Russian oil using oil supplies from OPEC 
countries. Thus, using pipeline Odessa-Brody with oil from the Caspian Sea region 
became of critical importance. Turkey was against “reverse” use of Odessa-Brody 
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because it also increased tanker traffic through its straits. Turkey demonstrates an 
understandable and consistent position on this issue. However, the Ukraine should not 
lose hope of future use of the Bosporus and Dardanelle Straits for oil supply when it stops 
using the Odessa-Brody pipeline in reverse mode.  
German Deutsche Bank opened the first credit of $300 million under the previous 
agreement of providing a credit line of 2 billion euros for the Naftogas Ukrayny national 
company.30 This credit was granted directly to the company (without governmental 
backing) for modernization of oil and gas transportation systems, geological exploration 
and other projects. The Chairman of Naftogas Ukrayny stated that money might also be 
used for construction of the Odessa-Brody-Plotsk project.  
                                                 





IX. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSITIONS 
The Ukraine’s energy system remains under Russian economic influence to a 
certain extent. This influence is mostly realized through Russian domination of oil, gas 
and nuclear fuel supply to Ukraine. Although Russia is not capable of strong and 
immediate dictation of economic terms for Ukraine’s development, it is still able to 
effectively use its economic advantage over Ukraine. Recent political developments in 
the Ukraine (including the Orange Revolution and election of a new pro-Western 
President) are not supported by Russia and do not match Russian policy towards the 
Ukraine. Thus, further attempts by Russia to change the political situation in Ukraine by 
means of economic pressure are still possible. In order to get free of Russia economic 
influence, the Ukraine should find and develop alternatives for its oil, gas and nuclear 
fuel supplies. Successful diversification includes the following measures: reforming and 
restructuring of oil, gas and coal industries, dealing with energy business clans formed on 
the basis of combination of state power and private capital, quickly competing the 
Odessa-Brody oil pipeline, and bringing in foreign investment.  
It is highly recommended that the Ukrainian government take quick steps in 
reforming the oil and gas industry structure in order to improve efficiency, reduce 
corruption and attract Western investments. One effective tool for such reformation 
would be privatization of some energy sector assets. However, this should be done very 
carefully because there are two negative developments possible. One is further 
concentration in the sector. To prevent that, the Ukrainian government should identify a 
list of companies for privatization. For national security reasons, some firms must remain 
under state control, such as Ukrtransnafta or Ukspectransgas, who control oil and gas 
pipelines. Companies like Ukrnafta or Chornomornaftogas can be privatized without 
serious concern of reducing competition. Another problem is that Russian oil and gas 
companies are still the most interested parties in privatization of Ukrainian assets. If not 






The same solution could be applied to the coal industry. Partial privatization is 
key to increasing coal production. However, the process of privatization should be 
planned effectively. For example, the Ukrainian government should stop its practice of 
offering only unprofitable mines for privatization. Nobody wants to buy them, and they 
would not bring in much revenue if sold. Instead, it might want to sell some profitable 
mines, which will bring more funds for closing or modernization of other industry assets. 
The unemployment problem, a result of necessary closings, would be partly solved as 
well if the terms of privatization would stipulate an increasing number of jobs. 
Restructuring and reforming the energy systems also depend on the degree of 
integration of business and politics. Although lobbying and other forms of interrelations 
between capital and policy have certain rationale, the Ukrainian government must be 
concerned about possible corruption. The development of relationships with such large 
corporations such as the Private Group would be a sign of the government ability's to 
carry out its reform agenda. Controlling nearly 50 percent of the country’s oil refinery 
capacity and 42 percent of its oil exploration, this group still maintains political 
influence, especially in its regional base at Dnipropetrovsk, which in turn is the most 
related to Russia. Relations with this corporation should be founded in state authority and 
national interests. At the same time, it needs to be done very flexibly in order to avoid 
promoting a command economy style.  
There is a strong chance that Ukraine can join the World Trade Organization by 
the end of 2005, if it is able to succeed in making reforms. To achieve this, Yushchenko’s 
cabinet should take necessary actions as soon as possible, because the parliamentary 
elections future political reform expected in 2006 might slow down the reform processes, 
if the opposition party of V. Yanukovych is successful in those elections.  
Since the Odessa-Brody pipeline is the most significant factor in Ukraine’s 
aspirations to diversify oil supply, the government should intensify its construction 
efforts for connecting to Polish infrastructure. This is the most important and most 
feasible measure for the Ukraine in the near future. Immediately after completing the 
pipeline, it should be used in its initially planned direction. In order to provide oil supply 





the pipeline is finished. The Ukrainian government has to reach a final agreement with 
Georgia for using its territory and Black Sea ports for transit, and also with Turkmenistan 
for its oil supply. Although Azerbaijan initially refused to participate in the project, 
Ukraine should not abandon efforts to make it another oil supplier.  
A quick completion of the Odessa-Brody pipeline opens a possibility to resume 
negotiations with Turkey about using the Bosporus and Dardanelle Straits. Reverse 
direction of the pipeline increased tanker traffic by 4 percent. If that is stopped, oil 
transported through the channels will decrease by 90 thousand barrels per day, and 
Ukraine might then have a chance to use this released capacity for importing oil. This 
would allow the renewal of talks about Libyan oil supply for the Ukraine. Thus, the 
importance of completing the Odessa-Brody pipeline has grown even more, because 
doing so will two new oil channels, and finding new sources of oil is exactly what the 
Ukraine needs.  
Further diversification of energy suppliers could be achieved by accelerated 
implementation of other oil and gas projects with OPEC countries. One of the main goals 
for the Ukrainian government should be acceleration of the projected construction of the 
Iran-Ukraine-Europe gas pipeline. This will not only help the Ukraine obtain economic 
independence, but will develop further cooperation with Western European countries. It 
is also recommended to advance the Ukraine’s participation in the exploration of Libyan 
oil and gas fields. At the same time, Ukraine should be very careful in developing 
relationships with the countries of Libya and Iran, as those states are subject to sanctions 
and embargoes. 
Since almost all reforms of Ukrainian energy systems, such as restructuring of the 
coal, oil and gas industries, require large investments, one of the critical goals might be to 
bring in foreign investments. In order to do this, the Ukraine should create favorable 
conditions for investors, including freedom of capital movement, security for foreign 
businesses, and an appropriate taxation policy. Russian capital is already prepared to 
intervene (and already has) in Ukrainian energy industries while Western businesses are 
still very cautious. The Ukraine might want to secure simultaneous participation of 





Therefore, each case of privatization or sale to foreign capital formations should be 
analyzed accordingly. For example, if a preliminary list of potential investors for a 
particular project consists of only Russian firms or if they are the majority, research must 
be done in order to investigate the causes for this, and then regulations should be changed 
correspondingly. 
Simultaneous and complex implementation of proposed measures would help 
Ukraine decrease its dependence on Russian energy sources. This will allow Ukraine to 
obtain not only economic independence, but will also decrease Russian political influence 







This appendix describes the modern theory of oil origins developed by Ukrainian 
and Russian scientists starting from 1950’s, which is different from traditional concepts. 
This modern theory would, if proven significantly change the world energy market.  
The traditional concept of crude oil origin assumes that petroleum somehow 
evolved from biological remains (detritus). For almost three hundred years, this 
hypothesis was the generally accepted explanation of how oil forms. As far back as 1757, 
the Russian academician Michailo Lomonosov presented the biogenic theory of oil: 
"Rock oil originates as tiny bodies of animals buried in the sediments which, under the 
influence of increased temperature and pressure acting during an unimaginably long 
period of time, transform into rock oil.” (Slovo o roshdenii metallov ot tryaseniya zemli, 
Proceedings of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, 1757). Since then, the 
bionic nature of oil became conventional wisdom for geological science.  
The first enunciation of an alternative hypothesis was made by the Soviet scientist 
N. Kudryavtsev in 195131. This new hypothesis assumes that petroleum is an abiotic, 
primordial material, which has been erupted from great depth to the crust of the Earth. 
During its first decade, new theory was controversial. Then, with its deeper development 
by Russian and Ukrainian scientists, the modern theory of deep, abiotic petroleum origins 
has become a respectable theory. This is how the Soviet professor Emmanuil B. 
Chekaliuk presented this theory at All-Union Conference on Petroleum and Petroleum 
Geology, Moscow, 1968: 
Statistical thermodynamic analysis has established clearly that 
hydrocarbon molecules which comprise petroleum require very high 
pressures for their spontaneous formation, comparable to the pressures 
required for the same of diamond. In that sense, hydrocarbon molecules 
are the high-pressure polymorphs of the reduced carbon system as is 
diamond of elemental carbon. Any notion which might suggest that 
hydrocarbon molecules spontaneously evolve in the regimes of 
temperature and pressure characterized by the near-surface of the Earth, 
which are the regimes of methane creation and hydrocarbon destruction, 
does not even deserve consideration. 
                                                 





Today, the modern Russian-Ukrainian study of abiotic oil origin is an extensive 
body of scientific knowledge that covers the chemical genesis of the hydrocarbon 
molecules which comprise natural petroleum, the physical processes which occasion their 
terrestrial concentration, the dynamic processes of the movement of the materials into 
geological reservoirs of petroleum, and the location and economic production of 
petroleum. In Ukraine, such institutions should be credited for the research and 
development of the abyssal, abiotic oil theory as Kiev Institute of Geological Sciences 
and Lviv Institute of Geology and Geochemistry of Combustible Minerals, Ukrainian 
National Academy of Sciences; Ukrainian Geophysical institute (Ukrgeophysica). The 
recent works are done by Ukrainian scientists I.Chebanenko, V.Klochko, A.Krayushkin, 
and E.Dvoryanin. In 1997 they were awarded the State Prize of Ukraine in the field of 
Science and Technology for successful oil exploration in Dnepro-Donets Basin32. 
Unfortunately, there is not much information can be found about present stage of 
development or applying of abiotic oil study as universally accepted theory to practical 
oil exploration.  
The main implication for economic affairs is that oil is not a fossil fuel and does 
not exists only in fixed, limited quantity in sediments of the Earth crust, but is available 
in larger quantities in deeper layers. This implies that petroleum availability depends 
mainly upon technological development and exploration competence33.  
In particular for the Ukraine, the modern theory of abiotic oil origins can play a 
significant role in oil exploration. According to the theory, there is a very high chance 
that much petroleum exists and will surely be produced from reservoirs underneath those 
presently being exploited. Thus, either the older oil fields would not be depleted soon, or 
deeper reservoirs could be explored and exploited. This may affect to both types of 
Ukrainian oil reserves - continental and sea shelves. If it is true, oil production in Ukraine 
will increase with exploration of Azov Sea shelves, instead of being constant as it is 
explained in Chapter V. Also, with the development of deep drilling technologies, 
Ukraine may become self-sufficient in oil. If this prospect materializes, then Ukraine’s 
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economic dependence on Russian oil will disappear as well as Russian influence on the 
Ukrainian future.  
However, even the practical confirmation of deep oil reservoirs existence will not 
solve Ukrainian problem immediately. At first, further research and development of the 
modern abiotic oil theory will demand from Ukraine certain acceleration of current 
scientific research. Then, Ukraine would need to advance in technology for deep drilling 
and deep extraction. All these still require large amount of financial investments, and 
thus, revert Ukraine to the earlier mentioned problems. 
Nevertheless, one should consider the conclusions and perspectives opened by 
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